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The discovery of quantum key distribution by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) bases on the funda-
mental quantum feature: incompatibility of measurements of quantum non-commuting observables.
In 1991 Ekert showed that cryptographic key can be generated at a distance with help of entangled
(correlated) quantum particles. Recently Barrett, Hardy and Kent showed that the non-locality
used by Ekert is itself a good resource of cryptographic key even beyond quantum mechanics. Their
result paved the way to new generation of quantum cryptographic protocols - secure even if the
devices are built by the very eavesdropper. However, there is a question, which is fundamental from
both practical and philosophical point of view: does Nature offer security on operational level based
on the original concept behind quantum cryptography - that information gain about one observable
must cause disturbance to another, incompatible one?
Here we resolve this problem by using another striking feature of quantum world - contextuality. It
is a strong version of incompatibility manifested in the famous Kochen-Specker paradox. The crucial
concept is the use of a new class of families of bipartite probability distributions which locally exhibit
the Kochen-Specker paradox conditions and, in addition, exhibit perfect correlations. We show that
if two persons share systems described by such a family then they can extract secure key, even if
they do not trust the devices which produce the statistics. This is the first operational protocol
that directly implements the fundamental feature of Nature: the information gain vs. disturbance
trade-off.
For sake of proof we exhibit a new Bell’s inequality which is interesting in itself. The security is
proved not by exploiting strong violation of the inequality by quantum mechanics (as one usually
proceeds), but rather by arguing, that quantum mechanics cannot violate it too much.
While quantum mechanics has been well established
basis for modern technology for years, recently we faced
completely new possibilities which quantum mechanics
offers for processing of information. One of the land-
marks is the quantum cryptography [1, 2], which allows
to obtain secure cryptographic key. The first quantum
protocol for key distribution was given by Bennett and
Brassard in 1984 [2], and it bases on fundamental quan-
tum mechanical trade-off between information gain and
disturbance. Couple years later Ekert proposed a new
idea for quantum cryptography based on peculiar quan-
tum correlations which may be shared by distant parti-
cles called entanglement [3].
The seminal paper by Ekert carried actually two quite
different concepts: (i) that quantum nonlocality can be
responsible for secure key and (ii) that the information
gain vs. disturbance trade-off of BB84 can be expressed
in terms of entanglement. The latter idea, clarified by
Bennett, Brassard and Mermin (BBM) [4] quite quickly
turned out to be crucial for the field of quantum cryp-
tography. In contrast, the first concept has become fash-
ionable only much later: after pioneering paper by Bar-
rett, Hardy and Kent [5] it became a boost for a new
generation of cryptographic protocols [6–9] - those ex-
ploiting solely the resource of non-locality, without re-
ferring to quantum mechanics at all. The protocols of
the new generation are now of central interest, as they
may become crucial for the modern technology. Indeed,
they pave the way to device-independent cryptography
(i.e. when the devices for producing secret key may be
produced by the very eavesdropper [6–11]). There are es-
sentially two approaches to device-independent security:
either one assumes solely no-signaling, or one assumes
validity of quantum mechanics. In either case, devices
are not trusted, and security is verified solely through
the statistics of the measurement outcomes.
Remarkably, BB84 as well as its entanglement based
version BBM have never received a device-independent
extension. A fundamental question arises: can the phe-
nomenon of information gain vs. disturbance trade-off
be used to run device-independent cryptography? At the
first sight it could seem that the situation is hopeless: as
we will see below, there is a serious obstacle to make the
BB84 protocol device-independent. One could therefore
think, that the main concept behind BB84 - the above
mentioned trade-off - cannot be put to work without com-
plete specification of the quantum device.
In this paper we argue that the obstacle can be over-
come, by use of BBM protocol, a version which was ini-
tially thought to be formally equivalent to BB84. The
main resource that allows to make the trade-off opera-
tional, and use it for cryptography is contextuality [47].
It is manifested by the famous Kochen Specker paradox
[12], which received recently much attention being de-
veloped both theoretically [13–17] and tested experimen-
tally [18–23]. However, it should be noted, that all those
2experiments require some additional assumptions, which
cannot be operationally verified (see [17]). We shall re-
fer to most popular version of KS paradox - the Peres-
Mermin one [24, 25] (see Fig. 1). However the present
approach seems to be quite general and suitable for other
variants of the paradox.
Since our result takes as a starting point the BBM
protocol, it carries out the whole philosophy behind BB84
with one important difference. Namely, in the proposed
protocol Alice makes measurement on a system which
will never be in hands of Eve afterwards. This feature
is crucial, if we want to have operational scheme, i.e.
the device-independent one. Indeed, suppose that Alice
measures a system which then goes into Eve’s hands.
Then the system may simply carry the information which
measurement of Alice was performed [48].
Our protocol is instead based on pairs of systems, one
kept by Alice and one sent to Bob. This prevents from
imprinting the information "which measurement" into
the system to which Eve has access. Therefore, the pro-
posed protocol is as close as possible to BB84, but not
more.
Let us emphasize, that although our goal is to obtain
security without direct referring to non-locality itself, our
protocol must somehow involve non-locality. Indeed if,
conversely, there existed some hidden variables, Eve can
possess them, hence knowing everything about Alice and
Bob systems. And in fact, there is a deep connection
between Kochen-Specker paradox and Bell inequalities:
contextuality being a heart of the KS-paradox translates
into non-locality manifested by violation of Bell inequali-
ties (see e.g. [26–28]). Interestingly, in our proof, instead
of using directly the fact, that there is strong non-locality,
we shall rather argue the opposite - that the system of-
fers security, because quantum mechanics cannot allow
for certain too-strong non-locality.
As a by-product we obtain a new (to our knowledge)
Bell’s inequality, having peculiar properties. Namely, a
recently introduced new principle information causality
[29] allows to violate it up to maximal algebraic bound,
while quantum mechanics does not. The inequality may
thus play important role in studying the fundamental
question to what extent information causality reproduces
quantum mechanical limitations of Nature.
The essential features of BB84 .- Let us briefly re-
call the BBM version of BB84 (in Lo-Chau-Ardehali style
[30]). Alice and Bob share many pairs in maximally en-
tangled state. They select a random sample for testing
purposes. On this sample, Alice and Bob measure on
their particles at random one of two non-commuting ob-
servables σx and σz. In case the particles are photons,
the observables may be taken horizontal vs. vertical po-
larization and 45◦ vs. 135◦ polarization respectively. If
the choices of Alice and Bob agree, the outputs should
be correlated if the state is indeed maximally entangled.
In presence of Eavesdropper or noise, the state may not
be exactly maximally entangled anymore, and therefore
Alice and Bob observe some error rate (correlations are
not perfect). If the error rate is too large, they abort
the protocol. If not, they measure σz on the remaining
pairs. The outcomes of the latter measurement are called
raw key. If the error were zero, then they would consti-
tute perfect key, while if the error is nonzero, but not too
large, Alice and Bob can apply procedures called error
correction and privacy amplification to obtain (asymp-
totically) perfect key from the raw key.
Thus the main idea behind is that Alice and Bob check
if they have correlations, and any Eavesdropper must de-
stroy the correlations, in order to gain knowledge. Let us
emphasize: we do not say here about special "non-local"
correlations but just standard correlations meaning that
outcome of Alice’s measurement is the same as outcome
of Bob’s measurement. Eve must introduce disturbance,
because the correlations are observed for outcomes of
noncommuting observables - the ones that cannot be si-
multaneously measured. This suggests that in our oper-
ational analogue we should use Kochen-Specker paradox,
which is a manifestation of impossibility to measure some
observables jointly.
We shall consider a notion of a "box" [31] - a family
of probability distributions. The box has finite number
of inputs and for given input, it returns output, whose
statistics is described by respective probability distribu-
tion. The inputs are simply observables. Our box will
respect quantum theory, i.e. it will be physically realiz-
able. On the other hand, since the number of probability
distributions is finite, it can be tested statistically, with-
out any knowledge of how the device was built.
For the purpose of our protocol, we shall propose a
Kochen-Specker bipartite box, which will exhibit the fol-
lowing features: on one hand the local outcomes will sat-
isfy KS constraints, which implies that they have to come
from observables that cannot be measured jointly, and on
the other hand if the same observable is measured by Al-
ice and Bob, the results are perfectly correlated (see [32]
in this context). We shall then prove, that such a box
provides about half bit of secrecy. Then we will consider
a noisy version of the box.
Peres-Mermin version of the Kochen Specker
paradox .- We shall use the Peres-Mermin version of
KS paradox [24, 25]. The quantum observables and the
KS conditions are depicted on Fig. 1. The Peres-Mermin
box (PM box) is the set of 6 joint probability distribu-
tions. Namely, the box has nine observables (inputs)
xij , i, j ∈ {1, ..., 3} in 3 × 3 array, and in any given row
(column) the binary observables can be measured at the
same time. The box is therefore a family of six prob-
ability distributions, (3 rows and 3 columns) and each
distribution is a joint distribution of three observables.
We demand that the outputs satisfy the following condi-
tion:
• [KS condition] The 6 joint distributions satisfy con-
straints, coming from Kochen-Specker type para-
dox: measuring the rows and two leftmost columns,
one always get even number of +1’s, while the last
column has always odd number of +1’s.
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FIG. 1: Peres-Mermin version of Kochen-Specker paradox.
We have 9 observables xi arranged into 3 × 3 array. If one
chooses the observables as in (b) - where we have two two-
level systems and σ(i)’s are Pauli matrices on i-th system -
quantum mechanics allows for joint measurement only of ob-
servables in a chosen row or a chosen column. One can ask
whether some better theory could reproduce quantum me-
chanical predictions, allowing however to predict outcomes of
all nine observables at the same time. This was the subject of
the famous Einstein-Bohr controversy. The Kochen-Specker
paradox says that it is impossible. Namely, quantum mechan-
ics predicts that along solid lines, the outcomes, if multiplied
give with certainty 1, while on the dashed line they give -1.
Thus, supposing that these nine observables have some preex-
isting values, which are merely revealed by measurement, we
would obtain different value of the product of all nine of them,
if multiply them in different order, which is a contradiction.
So if one insists on ascribing some definite values to observ-
ables, the value of at least one of them would need to depend
on whether the given observable is measured within row or
within column, i.e. on the context. Thus only contextual val-
ues can be ascribed. Recently, Kochen-Specker paradox was
expressed in terms of inequalities [15] which paved the way to
experimental verification of contextuality. The latter, how-
ever, is still not fully operational and needs some additional
assumptions.
In the following we shall consider a distributed version
of the above box.
Ideal distributed PM box and intrinsic
randomness.- We define a distributed Peres-Mermin
box, shared by Alice and Bob as follows. Both Alice
and Bob have Peres-Mermin array of observables, which
locally satisfy the above mentioned conditions (KS and
compatibility ones). Alice measures columns of the ar-
ray, while Bob measures rows. This, in particular as-
sures, that e.g. at Alice’s site each observable from the
array is measured in a fixed context, unlike in original
KS paradox, where there is only one laboratory, and
observables have to be measured in two different con-
texts. The same holds for Bob’s site. In addition we
assume AB-correlations, i.e. that there are perfect corre-
lations between the outcomes of the same observables on
Alice and Bob side. Also, we consider a non-signaling,
meaning, that Alice’s local distributions do not depend
on the choice of measurement by Bob. The no-signaling
condition allows to say meaningfully about Alice’s and
Bob’s local distributions (i.e. allow for existence of sub-
systems). Let us emphasize, that the distributed version
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FIG. 2: The distributed Peres-Mermin box. Solid or dotted
line means that there is an even number of −1’s while dashed
line - odd number of −1’s.
of Peres-Mermin box exhibit necessarily non-locality (as
is actually true for distributed version of any KS para-
dox see e.g. [26]). Indeed, in distributed scenario non-
contextuality translates into non-locality, which in turn
is a necessary condition for security.
Formally, distributed PM box is a family of 9 condi-
tional distributions P (a,b|A,B) Here A = 1, 2, 3 runs
over columns of PM array, B = 1, 2, 3 runs over rows of
the array. and a = (a1a2a3) and b = (b1b2b3) denote
triples of outcomes. As said, the family has to satisfy the
following conditions:
• [KS condition] For A = 1, 2 and B = 1, 2, 3 the
product of outcomes is 1, i.e. a ∈ {+ + +,− −
+,− + −,− − +}, and the same for b. For A = 3
the outcomes with nonzero probability multiply up
to −1, so that a ∈ {− − −,− + +,+ − +,+ + −}
in this case.
• [AB correlations] For A = i and B = j we have
ai = bj.
• [no-signaling] The marginal probability P (a|A,B)
does not depend on B and similarly for P (b|A,B)
does not depend on A.
Further we shall use a different notation, depicted on Fig.
2.
Intrinsic randomness from ideal distributed PM
box.- We shall now assume that a distributed PM box
comes from quantum mechanics, but we do not know how
it is implemented (i.e. what observables are measured,
and in which quantum state). We are thus in a paradigm
of device-independent security [11] which assumes validity
of quantum mechanics. Under such assumption we shall
show that the outcomes of a fixed row/column (for def-
initeness take first row of Bob’s system) possess about
0.44 bits of intrinsic randomness (hence they offer se-
curity). Consider first a simpler problem, namely let
us prove, that on Bob’s side, the outcomes of first row
and first column cannot be all deterministic, i.e. their
marginal probabilities cannot be all 0 or 1). Suppose,
conversely, that they are all deterministic. Without loss
of generality, we can assume that all the involved observ-
ables (B′1, B1, B
′′
1 , B
′′
2 , B
′′
3 ) have value +1. Due to perfect
correlations the corresponding A’s are also set to +1.
Exploiting now AB-correlations and KS-condition, one
obtains super-strong correlations for the following four
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FIG. 3: Deterministic values for first Bob’s row lead to a
system of perfect correlations and anticorrelations violating
maximally a Bell inequality. Solid or dotted line means that
there is an even number of −1’s while dashed line - odd num-
ber of −1’s.
outcomes: a ≡ A2, a′ ≡ A′3, b ≡ B′2, b′ ≡ B3. Namely,
pairs (ab), (ab′), (a′b) are perfectly correlated, while (a′b′)
is perfectly anti-correlated. Such correlations would vio-
late the CHSH inequality [33]
|〈ab〉+ 〈ab′〉+ 〈a′b〉 − 〈a′b′〉| ≤ 2 (1)
up to 4, while it is well known that quantum mechanics,
due to Tsirelson bound [34] allows only for 2
√
2.
Let us now show that also the first row itself cannot
have deterministic values at Bob’s side. Assuming now
that the values in the row are all +1, and exploiting KS-
condition and AB-correlations, we shall now obtain a sys-
tem of correlations. Note, that due to KS condition, we
have B3 = B1B2, and B
′
3
= B′
1
B′
2
. (We cannot say
that same about A’s because they are not measured in
rows). Now, values +1 in first row imply, that in addition
to perfect correlations for pairs (Ai, Bi) with i = 1, 2, 3,
we have also perfect correlations for pairs (A1, B
′
1) and
(A2, B
′
2
) and perfect anti-correlations for (A3, B
′
3
). The
whole reasoning is depicted on Fig. 3. This means that
they violate the following Bell inequality
γ(A : B) ≡ 〈A1B1〉+ 〈A2B2〉+ 〈A3B3〉
+〈A1B′1〉+ 〈A2B′2〉 − 〈A3B′3〉 ≤ 4 (2)
(where B3 ≡ B1B2, B′3 ≡ B′1B′2) up to 6, i.e. the corre-
lations again reach the absolute, algebraic bound. Now,
one can show that this is impossible from quantum me-
chanics. Namely, it was shown in [35] we know, that in
quantum mechanical correlations cannot allow to win a
so-called "pseudo-telepathy" game [49] which cannot be
won within a classical theory, if the game involves no
more than two observables on one of the sites. In our
case, since Bi’s can be jointly measured, they can be re-
garded as a single observable with four outcomes (same
for B′i). Thus we have two observables on Bob’s site,
and one can show that so extremal violation of the above
Bell inequality actually means winning a certain pseudo-
telepathy game. We shall not describe it in a full detail
here, because we intend to provide a quantitative upper
bound for quantum mechanical violation of the inequal-
ity. However, already at this point, we can notice that
while usually, to prove device-independent security one
was looking for a large violation, in our case, we have
to do the converse job, and rather show that some Bell’s
cannot be violated too strongly by quantum mechanics.
So far we have argued, that the values in first row
cannot be deterministic. However, in order to use it for
cryptography, we need some quantitative statements.
Let us thus first relate the degree of violation of the
inequality and the constraints on probability distribution
of the first row. To this end we shall use an equivalent
inequality expressed in terms of probabilities rather than
correlations:
β(A : B) ≡ p(A1 = B1) + p(A2 = B2) + p(A3 = B3)
+p(A1 = B
′
1
) + p(A2 = B
′
2
) + p(A3 6= B′3) ≤ 5. (3)
One finds that β(A : B) = (γ(A : B) + 6)/2. Let pi =
p(i|+) be probability that b1i = +1, i.e. it is marginal
probability of obtaining +1 for a given outcome from
the first row on Bob’s site. Then by using elementary
inequality p(C ∩D) ≥ p(C) + p(D)− 1 for any events C
and D, and exploiting AB-correlations and KS-condition
we obtain that
β(A : B) = p1 + p2 + p3 + 3. (4)
Suppose now we have the following bound for quantum
mechanical violation of inequality (3): β(A : B) ≤ β0 <
6. We obtain
p1 + p2 + p3 ≤ β0 − 3 (5)
i.e. not all of pi can be 1. In a similar way, employing
three other possibilities of assigning deterministic values
to the Bob’s first row (+ − −,− + − and − − +) one
obtains
p1 + (1− p2) + (1− p3) ≤ β0 − 3
(1 − p1) + p2 + (1− p3) ≤ β0 − 3
(1 − p1) + (1 − p2) + p3 ≤ β0 − 3 (6)
Let us now consider joint probability distributions for
the outcomes of the first row on Bob’s site q0 = q(+ +
+), q1 = q(+ − −), q2 = q(− + −), q3 = q(− − +), with
5q0 + q1 + q2 + q3 = 1. One gets the following relation
q0 =
1
2
(−1 + p1 + p2 + p3)
q1 =
1
2
(1 + p1 − p2 − p3)
q2 =
1
2
(1 + p2 − p2 − p3)
q3 =
1
2
(1 + p3 − p1 − p2) (7)
Then the constraints (6) imply
qi ≤ 1
2
(β0 − 4) = 1
4
(γ0 − 2) (8)
for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. We have obtained numerically γ0 =
5.6364, which gives
qi ≤ x. (9)
with x . 0.9091. Let us note here is easy to see that
x ≥ 1/2, as this value would correspond to β0 = 5, clearly
achievable even within classical theory. Finally note, that
due to AB-correlations, we have the same bounds for
probabilities in Alice’s first row.
Secure key from ideal box.- Suppose that Alice and
Bob share a bipartite box RAB (which they can verify by
testing samples). This box may be decomposable into
some other boxes,
RAB =
∑
e
qeR
e
AB (10)
(where we deliberately label boxes by e, as it will be Eve,
who knows which box ReAB is actually realized). The de-
composition (10) arises as follows: Eve creates a joint
box RABE , and hands the part RAB to Alice and Bob.
When they announce their choices of measurements, Eve
measures her part, and we do not specify her inputs and
outputs (the latter denoted by e), so that her power is to
split the Alice and Bob box RAB into arbitrary ensem-
ble {qe, ReAB} which satisfies
∑
e qeR
e
AB = RAB. This
power is analogous to the situation in quantum mechan-
ics, where we hand to Eve the purification of the Alice
and Bob state, which means that Eve controls the whole
Universe, except of Alice’s and Bob’s labs. That this is
the only thing which Eve can do, follows from impossi-
bility of signaling from Eve to Alice and Bob (see [10]).
Now, let the box RAB be a bipartite Peres-Mermin
box. Then the boxes ReAB must be bipartite Peres-
Mermin ones, too. This is because the conditions deter-
mining bipartite PM boxes (i.e. KS condition and AB-
correlations) are formulated as ascribing certain proba-
bilities value 0, while no-signaling is a principle assumed
to be always true (as we shall eventually use quantum me-
chanics which obviously obeys no-signaling). Thus Eve
can only decompose the box R again into distributed
PM-boxes.
Suppose now Alice and Bob share n boxes. They se-
lect a sample to verify, that they share distributed PM
box. In verification procedure, Alice measures at random
columns, while Bob measures at random rows. From the
rest of boxes they would like to draw key. We have shown,
that Eve cannot know the first row exactly, while Alice
and Bob are correlated. So Alice and Bob should both
measure first row, and thanks to AB-correlations, would
obtain key. However if Alice would measure row, she has
to use a different setup of the device, than she used when
measuring columns. Since our protocol is to be device-
independent, we have to assume, that the device can be
malicious. In particular, when Alice wants to measure
rows, she may in fact measure some completely differ-
ent observables than when she measured columns. And
Eve can know the outcomes of those new observables per-
fectly.
However, since we already know, that outcomes of
Bob’s first row are relatively secure, it is enough that
Alice measures also the first row provided, that the out-
comes are perfectly correlated with the Bob’s row, which
now we assume.
This suggests the following protocol. Alice and Bob
share n pairs of particles. They select two samples. On
the first sample, they measure at random columns and
rows, respectively. This allows to verify that they indeed
share a distributed PM box. On the second sample Alice
and Bob measure just the first row, and verify whether
their outcomes are correlated. On the rest of pairs Alice
and Bob measure also the first row, and the outcomes
constitute a so called raw key. Then they apply standard
procedures of error correction and privacy amplification,
to obtain shorter, but secure key. More precisely: in the
case of ideal PM box, error correction is not needed (as
the outcomes of Alice and Bob are by perfectly corre-
lated) and only privacy amplification will be performed.
The error correction is be needed in the noisy case, which
we will further describe.
To estimate the amount of obtained secure key, we shall
now analyse the triple of random variables (A,B,E).
The A and B are variables describing the first row of
Alice and Bob respectively, and E is the variable of Eve
describing the choice of ensemble (10) i.e. E = e with
probability qe. Now we can use the well known Csiszar-
Körner formula
K ≥ I(A : B)− I(A : E) (11)
which provides a lower bound for the rate K of secure
key [36, 37] where I(A : B) denotes Shannon mutual
information of the joint probability distribution of Al-
ice’s and Bob’s first row, and I(A : E) denotes mu-
tual information of joint probability distribution of Al-
ice’s row and output of Eve’s measurement. The formula
rewrite the expression by means of conditional entropies:
H(A|E) − H(A|B). Since Alice and Bob are perfectly
correlated, H(A|B) = 0. However Eve will split the box
into an ensemble, any member of ensemble is PM box has
to satisfy the bound (9). One easily find, that the distri-
bution of smallest entropy, which satisfies the bound is
(x, 1 − x, 0, 0). Thus H(A|E) ≥ 0.439, and this rate of
6secure key can be obtained.
The considered ideal distributed PM box corresponds
to the situation, where there is no disturbance (perfect
correlations between Alice and Bob). We see that in this
case, Eve can gain some knowledge, however she can-
not have full knowledge. We thus observe a version of
information-gain vs. disturbance trade-off, where it is
impossible to gain full knowledge about the system with-
out disturbing its correlations with another system. Be-
low we will complete the picture by considering presence
of disturbance.
Noisy case .- Suppose that Alice and Bob while mea-
suring correlations obtain average bit error rate q (i.e. q
is the ratio of anti-correlated events to all events). First
of all, let us note that the noisy box can still satisfy per-
fectly KS conditions. This is because Alice and Bob can
force it by measuring only two observables out of three
(that forms say a row), and fabricating the outcome of
the third one, rather than measuring it. Therefore, the
noise will influence correlations between Alice and Bob.
We shall assume that on the test samples, for any ob-
servable from the Peres-Mermin array Alice and Bob ob-
tained correlations with probability 1− ǫ, i.e. ǫ measures
the error level. Clearly, the larger the error, the looser
are the constraints for probabilities of the Bob’s first row.
One can find (see Appendix) that the constraints (9) be-
come now
qi ≤ x− 4.5ǫ (12)
with x ≃ 0.9091. From this, one can obtain the following
bound on H(E|B):
H(B|E) ≥ sup
δ>0
(1 − ǫ
δ
)h(x+ 4.5δ). (13)
The lack of correlations influences also H(B|A), which in
turn can be bounded as follows
H(B|A) ≤ h(3
2
ǫ) +
3
2
ǫ log 3. (14)
Inserting it to the Csiszar-Körner formula (11), and
putting δ = 1.8 we obtain that for ǫ . 0.68% secure key
can be obtained. This is smaller than typical thresholds
obtained from CHSH, which are of order of 2%. However
our estimates have not all been tight, and there is still
some room for optimization.
Quantum mechanical implementation and the
security level.- So far we have considered an abstract
box. To make use of our results, we need to know, that
the box can be realized in labs, i.e. that the box can be
simulated quantum mechanically. Indeed, it is the case:
the box is obtained by Alice and Bob measuring Peres-
Mermin observables (see Fig. 1) on two pairs of qubits
in maximally entangled state (which were recently used
to derive non-locality from contextuality [38], see also
[28]). Let us mention here, that if we had a tripartite
PM box, with perfect tripartite correlations, then one can
show that one secure bit can be obtained by the three
parties. And moreover, the security would come solely
from no-signaling assumption. However, though there
exists such a no-signaling box, unfortunately, cannot be
implemented by quantum mechanical devices, i.e. it does
not exist in Nature (this is actually implied by our present
result).
Our reasoning proves that the obtained key is secure
under the so called individual attack: Eve couple to each
box independently, and measures before Alice and Bob
perform error correction and privacy amplification pro-
cedures. We believe that one can apply the ideas of
[6, 7, 9, 11] to obtain stronger security.
Conclusions .- We have provided the first operational
protocol that directly implements the fundamental fea-
ture of Nature: the information gain vs. disturbance
trade-off rather than used so far non-locality. It imple-
ments the original idea of BB84, that one who gains in-
formation, will at the same time introduce disturbance,
but does it on operational level, i.e. the security is here
verified by the very statistics of the measurement, allow-
ing for the devices to be built by the very Eavesdropper.
The trade-off appears, because Alice and Bob measure
incompatible quantities, which we imposed by applying
Kochen-Specker paradox.
Let us compare our approach with the previous
device-independent protocols which directly employ non-
locality. Clearly our bipartite box must be non-local, oth-
erwise, as argued by Ekert, Eve could have full knowledge
of all results of measurements. However it is interest-
ing to find a more direct relation between our approach
and non-locality approach. To this end, one may em-
ploy non-locality obtained by Cabello [38] precisely for
the distributed PM paradox, and derive from it exis-
tence of the key to see the connection. Paradoxically,
we have proved security not by exploiting the fact that
our system exhibits a strong non-locality, but rather by
showing, that a part of our total system cannot exhibit
too strong non-locality. As a by-product we have ob-
tained a new Bell’s inequality, whose maximal violation
is excluded only within so-called second hierarchy of nec-
essary conditions for a given distribution be reproducible
by quantum mechanics according to classification of [39].
Remarkably, the exhibited bipartite box allows Eve’s
to gain some information without causing any distur-
bance. Thus the trade-off is not so strict as the one
offered by full quantum formalism. However this infor-
mation gain is smaller than the amount of correlations
shared by Alice and Bob (2 bits), which allows for creat-
ing secure key.
The fact, that from KS paradox one can obtain secu-
rity, appears to be not occasional from yet another point
of view. Namely, some sets of KS like observables (yield-
ing paradox), lead also to some error correcting codes
[40], and the latter are again connected with security
[41].
Finally, our work suggests some further developments.
First of all, in our paper we have obtained device-
independent security, which assumes validity of quantum
7mechanics. There is an open question, whether one can
have a stronger version of device-independent security -
the one based solely on no-signaling, and not assuming
any knowledge about quantum mechanics. To this end,
one should analyse other Kochen-Specker paradoxes and
apply them to obtain security. In other words, we believe
that analysis of restricted class of non-local scenarios - the
ones being distributed versions of local Kochen-Specker
paradoxes may lead to some interesting general results
on device-independent security.
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Appendix A: Bound for probabilities of the first
row: ideal PM box
Here we shall prove the bound (8) in more detail. Sup-
pose that upper row of Bob with certainty gives result
+ + +. This means, that upper observables from each
Alice’s row, have deterministic value +1. In other words,
with certainty we have A′′
1
= +1, A′′
2
= +1, A′′
3
= +1 (for
notation, see Fig. 2). Thus, due to KS conditions, the
two other observables in Alice’s rows are correlated in
two first rows, and anti-correlated in the last row:
A1 = A
′
1
A2 = A
′
2
A3 = −A′3. (A1)
On the other hand, from AB-correlations we have that
all those observables are perfectly correlated with cor-
responding Bob’s observables (i.e. Ai = Bi, A
′
i = B
′
i
and A′′i = B
′′
i for all i). Since each pair of observables
in the formula (A1) is jointly measurable, we obtain the
following correlations in the total system:
A1 = B1, A1 = B
′
1
A2 = B2, A2 = B
′
2
A3 = B3, A3 = −B′3. (A2)
There are three observables of Alice and six observables
of Bob involved. We now formulate Bell quantity
γ(A : B) ≡ 〈A1B1〉+ 〈A2B2〉+ 〈A3B3〉
+〈A1B′1〉+ 〈A2B′2〉 − 〈A3B′3〉. (A3)
The correlations (A2) mean that γ(A : B) = 6. We
shall now suppose that γ is not necessarily 6, and derive
constraints for Bob’s probability distribution for the first
row in terms of γ.
To this end, we shall use another closely related Bell
quantity:
β(A : B) ≡ p(A1 = B1) + p(A2 = B2) + p(A3 = B3)
+p(A1 = B
′
1) + p(A2 = B
′
2) + p(A3 6= B′3). (A4)
Let us note that
β(A : B) =
1
2
(γ(A : B) + 6). (A5)
Note that from AB-correlations we have that
p(A1 = B1) = p(A2 = B2) = p(A3 = B3) = 1. (A6)
We shall now relate the other three probabilities with
Bob’s distribution of the first row. Let us denote Bob’s
distribution in the first row by qi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 with
q0 = Pr(+1,+1,+1)
q1 = Pr(+1,−1,−1)
q2 = Pr(−1,+1,−1)
q3 = Pr(−1,−1,+1). (A7)
We have q0+q1+q2+q3 = 1. Consider now the marginal
distributions of each observable from the row, and let pi
be a probability that we obtain +1 for i-th observable in
the row, i.e. pi = Pr(B
′′
i = +1). More generally we shall
denote pi(k) = Pr(B
′′
i = k) for k = ±1. Here is relation
between qi and pi
p1 = q0 + q1
p2 = q0 + q2
p3 = q0 + q3. (A8)
Note that pi’s do not sum up to 1, as they represent three
separate probability distributions (pi, 1− pi). The above
relation gives
q0 =
1
2
(−1 + p1 + p2 + p3)
q1 =
1
2
(1 + p1 − p2 − p3)
q2 =
1
2
(1− p1 + p2 − p3)
q3 =
1
2
(1− p1 − p2 + p3). (A9)
At first sight, it might seem that the above relation allow
for negative qi’s, but we have to recall, that not all pi’s are
allowed due to KS conditions. We shall now first derive
the constrains for pi’s and then translate them into the
constraints for qi’s.
Now, note first that due to AB-correlations, each Al-
ice’s observable in the first row have the same distribu-
tion as Bob’s corresponding observable in his first row.
Thus pi’s are equal also to marginal distributions of ob-
servables from Alice’s first row. Consider now a chosen
9Alice’s observable from the first row. Due to KS condi-
tions we have
Pr(A1 = A
′
1
) = Pr(A′′
1
= +1) = p1. (A10)
Similarly, we have
Pr(A2 = A
′
2
) = p2
Pr(A3 = A
′
3
) = p3. (A11)
We consider now three events: X = {A1 = A′1}, Y =
{A′
1
= B′
1
} and Z = {A1 = B′1}. Clearly X ∩ Y ⊂ Z,
and using an elementary inequality valid for any events
Pr(X ∩ Y ) ≥ Pr(X) + Pr(Y )− 1 (A12)
we obtain that Pr(Z) ≥ Pr(X)+Pr(Y )−1 which means
that
Pr(A1 = B
′
1
) ≥ p1, (A13)
since Pr(Y ) = 1 (from perfect AB-correlations). Simi-
larly we obtain
Pr(A2 = B
′
2) ≥ p2
Pr(A3 6= B′3) ≥ p3. (A14)
Thus we obtain the following relation between β and pi’s
for perfect correlations:
β ≥ p1 + p2 + p3 + 3. (A15)
Thus we have proved the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Let β denote the Bell quantity (A4), and let
pi be probabilities of obtaining +1 while measuring i-th
observable of the first row of Bob. Then
p1 + p2 + p3 ≤ β − 3. (A16)
The lemma was obtained by analysing a situation when
Bob receives output + + + in the first row with some
probability, not necessarily equal to 1. In a similar way
we can treat three other events: +−−, −+− and −−+.
They lead again to prefect correlations/anticorrelations
for the observables (A2). For + − −, A2 and B′2, are
anticorrelated, for − + −, A1 and B′1 are anticorrelated
and finally for −−+ Ai are anticorrelated with B′i for i =
1, 2, 3. This leads, in turn, to three other Bell quantities
β1, β2 and β3 which are all equivalent to the quantity
β, via redefining some observables (multiplying by −1).
Thus maximal quantum mechanical values of all those
quantities are equal. Let us call this maximal value β0
Analysing the mentioned three cases in the same way
as above, we obtain
p1 + (1 − p2) + (1 − p3) ≤ β0 − 3
(1− p1) + p2 + (1 − p3) ≤ β0 − 3
(1− p1) + (1− p2) + p3 ≤ β0 − 3. (A17)
Using (A9), these inequalities and the fourth one ob-
tained in the lemma above, we get
qi ≤ 1
2
(β0 − 4), (A18)
and translating it into γ0 (which is a maximal quantum
value of quantity γ) we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The prefect AB-correlations and perfect KS
conditions imply that
qi ≤ 1
4
(γ0 − 2), (A19)
where {qi} is the joint probability distribution of the out-
comes of Bob’s first row.
Appendix B: Bound for probabilities of the first
row: noisy PM box
In this section we shall prove inequalities (13) and (14),
as well as provide the estimate for the noise threshold.
We consider a noisy PM box. The KS conditions are still
perfect, because in every row (column) one of observables
is not measured, but is produced to fit the conditions.
Thus only the AB-correlations are not perfect.
The error estimation in the protocol can be divided
into two parts. First, Alice measures chosen at random
columns and Bob - chosen at random rows. There are 9
different combinations of rows and columns, and in each
combination there is one common observable. We shall
assume that for each combination, there is the same prob-
ability of error ǫ (i.e. of obtaining different outcomes).
This stage determines bounds for probabilities of Bob’s
row (hence also puts bounds on H(B|E)).
In the second part of the error estimation, Alice mea-
sures first row, and Bob measures first row too. Let the
probability that their outcomes disagree be ǫ˜. In order
to have a single noise parameter, we need to relate ǫ˜ with
error probability for single nodes of the row, which for
simplicity we also assume to be ǫ. From KS condition we
get
ǫ =
2
3
ǫ˜. (B1)
This part of error estimation will put bound on H(B|A),
which we shall do in next section, where we derive bounds
for both conditional entropies.
In this section we shall deal with the first part. Let
us name the observables of the first Alice’s row A′′i , and
first Bob’s row B′′i .
We want to find constraints for probabilities of Bob’s
first row P (B′′). We shall start with P (B′′i = +1) ≡ pi,
By inequality (A12), and using the fact that B′′i and A
′′
i
are correlated with probability 1− ǫ we have
P (A′′i = +1) ≥ pi + (1− ǫ)− 1 = pi − ǫ (B2)
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By KS condition
P (A1 = A
′
1) = P (A
′′
1 = +1)
P (A2 = A
′
2
) = P (A′′
2
= +1)
P (A1 6= A′1) = P (A′′3 = +1). (B3)
Again, since B′i and A
′
i are correlated with probability
1− ǫ we have
P (A1 = B
′
1
) ≥ P (A1 = A′1) + P (A′1 = B′1)− 1 ≥ p1 − 2ǫ
P (A2 = B
′
2) ≥ P (A2 = A′2) + P (A′2 = B′2)− 1 ≥ p2 − 2ǫ
P (A3 6= B′3) ≥ P (A3 = A′3) + P (A′3 = B′3)− 1 ≥ p3 − 2ǫ
(B4)
On the other had we have
P (Ai = Bi) ≥ 1− ǫ (B5)
so that
β ≥ p1 + p2 + p3 + 3− 9ǫ (B6)
i.e.
p1 + p2 + p3 ≤ β′ − 3 (B7)
i.e. we have obtained constraints of the same form as in
the noiseless case (A15), with β replaced with β′ = β+9ǫ.
Similarly we can proceed for three other cases in Bob’s
first row (+ − −,− + −,− − +) to obtain the following
bound for joint probabilities qi of outcomes of the first
Bob’s row:
qi ≤ 1
2
(β0 + 9ǫ− 4), (B8)
and finally:
qi ≤ 1
4
(γ0 − 2) + 9ǫ
2
. (B9)
Due to our bound γ0 ≤ 5.6364 we get
qi ≤ 0.9091 + 4.5ǫ (B10)
For all i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Appendix C: Bound on conditional entropies
Let us start with bound for H(B|A). This entropy is
evaluated on joint probability distribution coming from
first row on Alice side and first row on Bob’s side. Let
ǫ˜ be probability of error (i.e. that the outcomes differ).
Then we use Fano’s inequality:
H(B|A) ≤ h(ǫ˜) + ǫ˜ log(|B| − 1) = h(ǫ˜) + ǫ˜ log 3 (C1)
A more natural error parameter for the whole protocol
is probability of error in single node. We assume that in
each node the probability of error is the same, equal to
ǫ, hence by (B1)
H(B|A) ≤ h
(
3
2
ǫ
)
+
3
2
ǫ log 3. (C2)
Let us now estimate conditional entropy H(B|E).
First, consider a box which satisfies KS conditions and
have probability of anticorrelations ǫ. The entropy of
Bob’s first row is bounded from below by
H(B; ǫ) ≥ h(x) ≡ f(ǫ) (C3)
where x = min(0.9091 + 4.5ǫ, 1). Note that f is non-
negative, decreasing function of ǫ. Let Eve make a mea-
surement on her system. This splits Alice’s and Bob’s
box into ensemble: RAB =
∑
e reR
e
AB. For notational
convenience, let us use indices i in place of e. Then
H(B|E) = inf
∑
i
riH(B)i (C4)
where H(B)i is Bob’s first row entropy of box R
i
AB
and infimum is taken over all decompositions RAB =∑
i riR
i
AB The new boxes R
e satisfy
∑
i
riǫi = ǫ. (C5)
Thus H(B|E) is bounded as follows
H(B|E) =≥ inf
{ri,ǫi}
∑
i
rif(ǫi), (C6)
where
∑
i riǫi = ǫ,
∑
i ri = 1. To estimate the above
quantity note that by Markov inequality we have
∑
i:ǫi<δ
ri ≥ 1− ǫ
δ
. (C7)
This gives
H(B|E) ≥ sup
δ
(1 − ǫ
δ
)h(0.9091 + 4.5δ). (C8)
Overall, we obtain the following bound on key rate:
K ≥ H(B|E)−H(B|A) ≥ sup
δ
(1− ǫ
δ
)h(0.9091 + 4.5δ)−
{
h
(
3
2
ǫ
)
+
3
2
ǫ log 3
}
. (C9)
Putting δ = 1.8ǫ we obtain the following noise threshold,
below which sharing key is possible.
ǫ0 ≤ 0.68%. (C10)
This is smaller than typical thresholds obtained from
CHSH, which are of order of 2%. However we have not
performed optimization in (C6), which would give a bet-
ter rate.
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Appendix D: Bound for a Bell inequality
Here we outline the way we obtained quantum-
mechanical bound for the Bell inequality (2). We shall
follow Refs. [46] and [39] (their methods originate from
Tsirelson approach [34]). Namely, a matrix Γ˜ with the
following matrix elements Γ˜ij = 〈ψ|X†iXj |ψ〉 is always
positive semidefinite, for any state ψ and any collecion of
operators Xi. Hence a matrix Γ =
1
2
(Γ˜+ Γ˜∗) where ∗ de-
notes complex conjugation is a real positive semidefinite
matrix.
For our purpose the role of Xj’s will be played by the
following ten operators
I, A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, B
′
1, B
′
2, B
′
3. (D1)
The resulting matrix Γ has thus 1’s on diagonal, and
moreover satisfies a couple of constraints. Namely, The
equalities
〈IB1〉 = 〈B2B3〉, 〈IB2〉 = 〈B1B3〉, 〈IB3〉 = 〈B1B2〉
(D2)
imply
Γ1,5 = Γ6,7, Γ1,6 = Γ5,7, Γ1,7 = Γ6,5. (D3)
Similar equalities for B′i’s imply further three constraints
Γ1,8 = Γ9,10, Γ1,9 = Γ8,10, Γ1,10 = Γ8,9. (D4)
Here is the full matrix Γ˜, where by × we denote un-
determined elements, which are constrained only by its
positivity. The elements bi and b
′
i are also undetermined.
we do not write explicitly elements below the diagonal,
as the matrix is Hermitian.
I 〈A1〉 〈A2〉 〈A3〉 〈B1〉 〈B2〉 〈B3〉 〈B′1〉 〈B′2〉 〈B′3〉
I 1 × × × b1 b2 b3 b′1 b′2 b′3
〈A1〉 1 × × 〈A1B1〉 × × 〈A1B′1〉 × ×
〈A2〉 1 × × 〈A2B2〉 × × 〈A2B′2〉 ×
〈A3〉 1 × × 〈A3B3〉 × × 〈A3B′3〉
〈B1〉 1 b3 b2 × × ×
〈B2〉 1 b1 × × ×
〈B3〉 1 × × ×
〈B′
1
〉 1 b′
3
b′
2
〈B′
2
〉 1 b′
1
〈B′3〉 1
(D5)
In terms of the matrix Γ, the Bell’s inequality reads as
follows:
γ =
1
2
Tr(ΓW ), (D6)
where
W =


0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0


(D7)
Now, we obtain upper bound for value γ, by maximizing
the right-hand-side of (D6) under the constraints (D3)
and (D4) and Γ ≥ 0. This can be done by a standard
SDP packages. We have used SDPT3 package for Mat-
lab. However, it turns out that the upper bound here is
trivial, i.e. it is equal to 6. This can be directly verified:
namely, there exists a matrix which gives 6, is positive
and satisfies the constratins:
Γ0 =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 −1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 −1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 −1 0 0 1


(D8)
Thus the application of the so called first SDP hierar-
chy according to terminology of [39] does not result in a
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nontrivial upper bound. We have therefore checked the
second hierarchy, where Xi’s are all possible products of
pairs of the set I, A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, B
′
1
, B′
2
, B′
3
. This
leads to another SDP program, which produces a non-
trivial upper bound for the Bell’s inequality, i.e. 5.6364.
The set of constraints of type (D3) we have generated on
Mathematica, while the SDP program was run by use of
SDPT3 free tool for Matlab.
